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A B S T R A C T
Academics across disciplines are increasingly employing political ecology lenses to unpack conﬂicts related to
resource extraction. Yet, an area that remains under-researched and under-theorised is how environmental
impact assessments (EIAs) are embedded in politics and imagined as sites of power relations. Drawing on long-
term ﬁeldwork in Zimbabwe engaging small-scale gold miners, EIA consultants and government oﬃcials, this
article examines the changing social signiﬁcance of EIAs during and after a nationwide police operation that was
framed by authorities as targeting non-compliance with environmental policy, illegal mining and illicit trading.
Among other articulations of dissent, small-scale miners associations protested that EIA enforcement rhetoric
served unjustly as a rationale for halting livelihoods and extracting rent from miners in times of economic
diﬃculty. The article challenges EIA narratives that focus narrowly on risk management or governance failure,
exploring technocratic obfuscations and how enforcement rhetoric was perceived in relation to criminalisation
and coercion, expert environmental consultancy cultures and adapted legacies of colonial practice in con-
temporary dynamics of rule. Heavy-handed policing under the banner of enforcing order impinged on liveli-
hoods and had counterproductive eﬀects in addressing environmental problems, while complying with ex-
pensive EIA report-producing requirements was far beyond the means of most small-scale miners. The article
rethinks how technical EIA rhetoric becomes entangled in spaces of contentious politics, the perils of looking
only at particular scales of relations to the exclusion of others, and what it means to re-engage Donald Moore’s
notion of “shifting alignments and contingent constellations of power.” Suggesting future directions in political
ecology theorising in relation to extractive sectors, it calls for careful attention to the situated politics of EIAs –
situated in time and space, amid varying relations of power – and how multiple hegemonic practices are con-
ceptualised and challenged.
1. Introduction
In 2012, Anthony Bebbington’s published lecture entitled
“Underground Political Ecologies” argued that mineral extraction had
been chronically understudied in political ecology and called for more
research on power struggles in extractive sectors (Bebbington, 2012).
Since then, geographers have produced a growing body of political
ecology literature on extractive sector contestations (Allen, 2017;
Williams and Le Billon, 2017; Andrews and McCarthy, 2014), including
much conceptually and empirically rich work devoted to nuances of
hegemony, dispossession and resistance in large-scale mining contexts
(Horowitz, 2015; Perreault, 2013; Perreault et al., 2015; Bedi, 2013).
However, a far smaller body of political ecology work has addressed
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), a sub-sector expanding in
many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, providing income to a
larger number of people than large-scale mining and widely linked with
marginalisation and environmental degradation (Huggins et al., 2017;
Hilson and Maconachie, 2017; Campbell, 2016). Tschakert and Singha
(2007) explored how mainstream pollution discourses in Ghana interact
with political forces to give ASM communities “contaminated iden-
tities.” Hirons (2011) discussed anti-deforestation discourses and arti-
sanal mining through a post-structural political ecology lens, warning
that global initiatives such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Degradation (REDD) can further marginalise artisanal miners in
Africa, forcing livelihoods further into illegality. Adding to these con-
tributions, the present article examines the political ecology of
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environmental impact assessment (EIA) policy discourses and enforce-
ment practices in the ASM sector, drawing on long-term research in
Zimbabwe addressing dynamic and territorially uneven struggles. The
article argues that unpacking situated contestations around EIAs pre-
sents a critical avenue for rethinking diverse social, material and
symbolic meanings attached to techno-political1 practices for control-
ling resource extraction. It suggests how rethinking EIA power struggles
can become a key entry point into re-imagining territorial politics “in 3-
D” (Bridge, 2013) – linking subsurface resource politics with changing
environmental regulations, what transpires in the name of environ-
mental governance (including criminalization of marginalized con-
stituencies), contested expert practices and diversely experienced and
dynamic geographies of power.
Recent literature has investigated inequalities of political power and
notions of “community-controlled” in relation to large-scale mining
EIAs (O'Faircheallaigh, 2017). Fabiana Li’s book Unearthing Conﬂict
elucidates the power dynamics of how large-scale mining EIAs were
part of an “expert” environmental management system that served to
undermine public trust in Peru (Li, 2015). There is a burgeoning body
of scholarship addressing the problem whereby EIAs for large-scale
mining are, as Leonard (2017) writes, “tokenistic tools to approve de-
velopments rather than to genuinely engage with the concerns of in-
terested and aﬀected groups” (p. 1). Yet, although EIA policies can be
crucial instruments for environmental management in many situations,
their entanglements in political processes and power relations remains
under-studied in a range of ways. As noted by Wells-Dang et al. (2016)
there are surprisingly “few examples” of EIA research through a “po-
litical economy” lens. While the importance of EIAs as tools for gov-
ernance might sometimes appear to be as “universal” and “self-evident”
as the “rules of property” that Timothy Mitchell (2002) famously de-
scribed in Rule of Experts, the material, political and symbolic sig-
niﬁcance of EIA policies can vary greatly – eliciting a range of per-
spectives (Cashmore and Richardson, 2013).
The present study explores a context in which the enforcement of
EIA requirements became a discursive rationale for a widespread
crackdown against artisanal and small-scale miners and afterwards
continued to present (and add to) formidable obstacles to de-crim-
inalising gold mining livelihoods in the years that followed. It focuses
speciﬁcally on Zimbabwe in a period shaped by deep economic and
political crises. Nationwide police operations emerged in November
2006 when state authorities launched Operation Chikorokoza Chapera
(meaning “No More Illegal Mining” in ChiShona), leading to more than
25,000 artisanal and small-scale miners being arrested, with thousands
displaced from mines that had provided them with livelihoods
(Kanyenze, 2011; Spiegel, 2014). Rhetorically, the need to enforce EIA
policies served as a chief rationale for expanding police campaigns,
following the Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s move – in Jan-
uary 2007 – to start strictly enforcing EIA policies for all types of
mining (New Zimbabwe, 2007). Since then, the EIA requirement has
continued to provoke tense debate in mining communities, where dy-
namic struggles raise important avenues for understanding how dis-
courses of environmentalism are situated and contested in a complex
political terrain.
Struggles in mining communities elicit wide-ranging debate among
academics concerned with rural place-making, marginalisation, power,
dispossession and conﬂict, leading to diﬀerent views on where em-
pirical and conceptual attention should be placed (Huggins, 2016;
Hilson and Maconachie, 2017; Bush, 2009; Lahiri-Dutt and Dondov,
2017; Côte and Korf, 2016; Fisher and Mwaipopo, 2013; Childs, 2014;
Geenen and Claessens, 2016; Bryceson and Geenen, 2016; Verbrugge
et al., 2015; Hatcher, 2016; Salman and de Theije, 2017; Werthmann,
2017; Luning and Pijpers, 2017). Hirons’ (2011) notion of “hegemonic
environmental management discourses” suggests a focus on discursive
politics and how dominant discourses mask the challenges facing
poorer artisanal miners. My analysis here adds to this discussion and
also to critiques of a longer history of coercive state responses to in-
formality (Kamete, 2008a,b, 2017), the roles of technical planning ex-
perts in systems of political violence (Mitchell, 2002) and environ-
mental discourses and policies in Zimbabwe that have privileged the
narrow interests of political and economic elites (Alexander and
McGregor, 2000; McGregor, 2005; Moore, 1993). An important his-
torical analogy lies in the work of McGregor (1995), which examined
how colonial environmental discourses “drew on scientiﬁc under-
standings promoted by their technical training and a hegemonic colo-
nial ideology of disrespect for African production,” resulting in “coer-
cion and punitive restrictions on resource use” (p. 272); this work
brought critical attention to how particular combinations of hegemonic
environmental discourse and coercion were major components of co-
lonial era governance regimes. My approach is also informed by poli-
tical ecology work addressing resource conﬂicts in Zimbabwe’s eastern
highlands in the early 1990s, where Donald Moore (1993) explored
how Gramsci’s concept of hegemony helps move beyond a narrow
materialistic understanding of resource conﬂict in which power might
be seen in strictly institutional terms or as forms of physical domina-
tion. In considering how hegemonic power shapes mainstream dis-
courses and meanings, Moore also reminds us that with Gramscian
notions of hegemony, “dominant meanings are always contested, never
totalizing, and always unstable, even when they encourage degrees of
subordinate people's ‘consent’ to particular forms of oppression” (1993,
p. 383).
In this vein, my analysis emphasizes how engaging the political
ecology of EIA discourses and enforcement practices requires a careful
focus on situating meanings and precisely their unstable nature, paying
attention to how power relations around resource extraction can
change over time and space, articulated from diverse vantage points.
This requires heeding the caution that analysis of “the state” is often
liable to “reproduce in its own analytical tidiness” an “imaginary co-
herence” that misrepresents “the incoherence of state practice”
(Mitchell, 2006, p. 169). Confronting this risk requires academics to
consider diverse ways in which state practices and eﬀects of state power
can be manifested, rethinking the shortcomings of narrow con-
ceptualisations of power. Elsewhere Mitchell (1990) has challenged
narrow conceptualisations that simplistically read power through an
imagined binary between hegemonic and coercive power, and Moore
(2005) has stressed that the eﬀects of ‘national’ politics may be in-
ﬂected through varying micro-political struggles. Addressing the
2006–2016 period, others have discussed numerous ways in which
political elites in Zimbabwe turned to new tactics of controlling mineral
wealth; at certain points in time this coincided with attempts “to regain
slipping hegemony” (Saunders and Nyamunda, 2016, p. vi) amid spir-
alling economic crisis and deep political tensions between the ruling
party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF), and its opposition as well as within diﬀering factions of ZANU-PF.
During the period of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera in 2007–2008,
economic relations were shaped signiﬁcantly by criminalized networks
of mineral extraction and trading in both gold and diamonds; and in-
tensiﬁed repressive measures in the mining sector could be seen, among
other explanations, as consequences of temporarily de-stabilized poli-
tical hegemony along with dramatically changing political dynamics
around resource capture and control, with a plethora of powerful elite
actors involved (Saunders and Nyamunda, 2016; Spiegel, 2015a). I
especially build here on Gramscian-inspired political ecology work
calling for attention to both macro-structural forces and the micro-
1 My use of the notion of “techno-politics” builds on past deﬁnitions that refer to “the
strategic practice of designing or using technology to embody, or enact political goals”
(Hecht, 1998, p. 56) and “the kinds of social and political practices that produce si-
multaneously the powers of science and the power of modern states” (Mitchell, 2002, p.
312, note 77). In situating techno-political practices surrounding EIA discourses, I use this
term, as these authors do, with a caution against determinism – stressing that the material
and power eﬀects of techno-political practices are variable, at times unpredictable and
produced by diverse assemblages of actors.
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politics of resource conﬂicts, stressing their contingent sociocultural,
environmental and economic interpretations, seeing the “environment”
as an important terrain of material and symbolic struggle (Moore, 1993;
Bridge, 2014; Ekers, 2009).
This study draws on interviews over a ten-year period with more
than 200 artisanal and small-scale gold miners in the districts of Insiza,
Umzingwani, Kadoma, Shamva and Mazowe as well as in Harare and
Bulawayo, with ﬁeldwork in mining areas in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009,
2012, 2013 and 2015. After national authorities introduced a new EIA
requirement in 2007, ﬁeld research turned to interrogating the drivers
of new enforcement discourse, how artisanal and small-scale miners
were aﬀected in the short term as well as longer-term legacies.
Unpacking this required interrogating a myriad of power relations that
shaped divergent experiences in mining areas, including for mining
groups seeking to “de-criminalise” their livelihoods. Interviews were
also conducted with EIA consultants and oﬃcials from the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism, Ministry of Mines and Mining Development,
Zimbabwe Republic Police and Gold Collections Unit of the Reserve
Bank, complemented by reviews of newspaper articles, policy docu-
ments and EIA reports for mines in the above districts. Ethnographic
work at digging sites, gold milling and processing areas, riverbed gold
panning sites, gold buying locations, homes of artisanal and small-scale
miners and other locations shaped a political ecology orientation that
emphasizes diverse temporally and geographically contingent articu-
lations, as well as analysis of media coverage of a dynamic national EIA
controversy.
The section below situates changing EIA requirements and dis-
courses in Zimbabwe’s mining sector in the 2000s. The subsequent
sections unpack ecological and political processes at play, discussing
concerns about EIA ineﬀectiveness along with criminalization, tech-
nocratic obfuscation and the “rule of experts” (Mitchell, 2002) in en-
vironmental consultancy cultures as well as unevenness in enforcement.
After examining how state actors’ use of a universal EIA requirement as
a rationale for policing produced new forms of marginalisation and
protracted waiting for miners struggling to resume livelihood activities,
the discussion explores how small-scale miners associations made ef-
forts to resist and advocate for more eﬀective environmental policy
alternatives, in some cases protesting EIA impositions as forms of
modern colonialism. The conclusion brieﬂy outlines some wider im-
plications for political ecology, particularly for situating socio-ecolo-
gical and power struggles in relation to multiple hegemonic forces and
practices in contexts of resource extraction. Recognising that environ-
mental risk mitigation policies can be critically important but also
contentiously used and at times invoked selectively to maintain the
hegemony of elite actors, it cautions geographers to be vigilant in in-
terpreting the variable ways in which EIA policies are socially and
politically signiﬁcant in mining areas.
2. Situating a changing mining environment and new EIA
enforcement narratives
Political ecology literature has widely deliberated on dilemmas of
contextualisation – where to start one’s analysis, and how to begin
conceiving of complex webs of relation and/or chains of causation that
shape environmental conﬂicts (Rocheleau, 2008; Escobar, 2006; Huber,
2017; Turner, 2017; Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2015; Sundberg, 2017;
Sultana, 2011; Harris, 2004). There is also a longstanding body of po-
litical ecology scholarship on coercive resource control and state vio-
lence, especially surrounding conservation agendas where “the state’s
mandate to defend threatened resources and its monopolization of le-
gitimate violence combine” (Peluso, 1993, p. 199). Zimbabwe’s tense
climate for environmental governance over the past decade is the
product of years of economic and political crisis – exacerbated by
complex tensions with foreign powers as well as the negative legacies of
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) policies pro-
moted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(Sachikonye, 2012; Carmody, 2001).
As Zimbabwe experienced economic downturns in the 1990s and
early 2000s, rural populations increasingly depended on artisanal and
small-scale mining, involving diverse networks of people in mineral
extraction, processing, selling and buying (Mabhena, 2012; Spiegel,
2015b). Mabiza (2013) discussed recurrent drought and the negative
impacts of ESAP – which resulted in reduced government spending and
general economic decline characterised by massive retrenchments in
both the public and private sectors – as some of the factors behind the
increase in gold mining activities in the 1990s. Carmody (1998) and
Carmody and Taylor (2003) provided detailed analysis of how the
government’s embrace of ESAP and related policies in the 1990s de-
vastated industrial sectors and created widespread joblessness – con-
stituting a remarkable reversal for what had once been one of the most
industrialised economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the mid and late 2000s, economic crisis and eventually extreme
hyperinﬂation created new pressures that further heightened the im-
portance of mineral extraction. Oﬃcial annual inﬂation levels rose
above 1000 percent in 2006, above 60,000 percent in 2007 and above
230 million percent in 2008 – with unoﬃcial inﬂation running above
80 sextillion percent (Hanke, 2008). Inter-linked economic and political
crises –marked by the drastic distortion of state budget funds to pay the
military, among other inﬂuences2 – negatively aﬀected agriculture and
all other sectors (Sachikonye, 2012), amid much debate on how land
reform impacted livelihoods (Scoones, 2017; Scoones et al., 2012;
Rutherford, 2016), with ASM again becoming an exceedingly wide-
spread economic coping strategy (Spiegel, 2009a; Kamete, 2008a,b).
Such mining provided incomes for diverse populations of technically
skilled and unskilled miners, including many people without prior
mining experience (Mabhena, 2012; Kamete, 2008a,b). Estimates sug-
gested that ASM, largely involving people without mining licenses,
provided income directly or indirectly for more than two million people
nationally (Hayes, 2008). Research in Zimbabwe also proﬁled negative
social impacts of mining including injustices arising from exclusionary
modes of mineral resource governance – for example, relating to forced
relocation of communities from the contested Marange diamond mining
areas (and the non-applicability of “indigenisation and empowerment”
policies to artisanal and small-scale mining) (Muchadenyika, 2015;
Bhatasara, 2013; Murombo, 2013; Dube et al., 2016) – and how poli-
tical elites created new networks to accumulate wealth from small-scale
mining (Mawowa, 2013).
Tunhuma et al. (2007), assessing small-scale gold mining in the
Limpopo Basin of Zimbabwe, linked ASM with land erosion, sedi-
mentation of rivers and pollution, attributing the most signiﬁcant en-
vironmental degradation to gold panning in rivers, which elevated
aquatic sulphates and introduced mercury into water systems. Like
several other environmental scholars (e.g. Maponga and Ngorima
(2003)) and Zwane et al. (2006)), they recommended that ASM activ-
ities, such as gold panning, be legalized so that risks could be better
managed – particularly through decentralized regulatory systems where
Rural District Councils could be actively involved in licensing and
technically assisting groups of artisanal miners in methods that would
reduce riverbed impacts. Indeed this policy view has long been ad-
vanced in environmental scholarship in Zimbabwe (Shoko, 2002).
However, as hyperinﬂation increased, political crisis deepened and
economic struggles intensiﬁed in the 2005–2008 period, state agencies
introduced coercive policies in several sectors of the economy (Jones,
2010a) – part of what has been written about in detail elsewhere as a
resort to authoritarian practices (Sachikonye, 2012; Dorman, 2016). In
2006, national authorities repealed the legal statute3 that allowed Rural
2 For wider discussion of the contentious framings and genesis of Zimbabwe’s political
crises, see (for example) Hammar et al. (2010), Dorman (2016), Rutherford (2016) and
Raftopoulos (2010).
3 Statutory Instrument 275 of 1991 (Alluvial Gold and Public Streams Regulation).
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District Councils to license one of the most common forms of ASM,
alluvial gold panning along rivers, citing environmental reasons. This
re-centralised power over gold – reasserting the power of the national
state apparatus as the arbiter of legitimate extractive practice – eﬀec-
tively leaving only land-based hard rock (primary ore) gold mining as a
potential legal source of ASM-related income in gold-rich regions.
Thereafter, the Ministry of Mines still issued some special grants for
riverbed alluvial gold mining to powerful companies and businessmen
partnered with state agencies, but acquiring such grants cost thousands
of dollars, far above artisanal and small-scale miners’ means (interview
with President of Zimbabwe Miners Federation, February 2014). Ac-
companying other reconﬁgurations of state power and modes of poli-
tical and social ‘disciplining’ amid hyperinﬂation (Jones, 2010a), the
government then deployed police campaigns as part of Operation Chi-
korokoza Chapera, initially launched in November 2006 as an initiative
of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Republic Police to
curb smuggling and illegal mining (Spiegel, 2014). Some news media
started to cover this operation as a matter of “pillage and patronage” –
outlining economic and political motivations for the crackdowns, while
also predicting that government leaders would start to claim that en-
vironmental concern was behind the operation: “They will plead the ex-
cuses of trying to prevent a cholera outbreak, or protecting the environment -
ﬁne! - but this isn't how it should be done, and they know it” (Sokwanele,
2007).
Indeed the above statement foreshadowed the next ‘discursive turn’
in policing; the operation started to be branded as a nationwide en-
vironmental initiative in January 2007, when the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism suddenly began requiring all miners to have
approved EIA reports and Environmental Management Plans, making
most mining illegal. The Ministry of Environment and Tourism in-
troduced Statutory Instrument 7 of 2007 (Environmental Impact
Assessment and Ecosystems Protection) Regulations, which compelled
activities listed under the ﬁrst schedule of the Environmental
Management Act CAP 20:27 (including mining) to undergo an EIA
process. Debates soon emerged about how police were “overzealous” in
imposing laws, with small-scale miners widely reporting that police
cited the lack of an EIA while conﬁscating gold, ore and equipment, in
some cases destroying miners’ houses and seizing household posses-
sions (Metcalf and Spiegel, 2007). Environmental oﬃcials became in-
volved in closing down mines, with police in some cases arresting
hundreds of miners at a time, including many working in licensed
mining areas, as both illegal mining and smuggling became the basis for
new stiﬀ penalties (Spiegel, 2014).
Connections between risk, environmental policy and politics have
long been debated in Zimbabwe, with scholars calling for critical un-
derstandings of how state actors use environmental crisis narratives
(Keeley and Scoones, 2000). In 2007, the Deputy Minister of Environ-
ment and Tourism declared to the media: “The law applies to all mi-
ning operations - big or small. It does not matter who owns the mine, it will
be closed if they fail to meet the stipulated [EIA] requirements” (Mineweb,
2007). EIA enforcement and the violence of Operation Chikorokoza
Chapera came as a surprise to many miners. The initial move to start
enforcing EIA requirements also came as a surprise to numerous oﬃ-
cials in the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development who were also
not consulted prior to the enactment of Statutory Instrument 7 of 2007;
this lack of consultation was expressed to me by several oﬃcials from
the Ministry of Mines in 2007 and constitutes just one illustration of
some of the fragmentation within state institutions. By March, some
newspapers outlined the ramiﬁcations with headlines such as “25,000
small scale miners lose claims since November” (New Zimbabwe, 2007),
highlighting some of the ways in which EIAs quickly became signiﬁcant
on a national scale. New discursive terrains for debating en-
vironmentalism henceforth emerged. National environmental autho-
rities spoke about EIAs in technocratic terms as a matter of switching
from voluntary to mandatory due diligence. Before Statutory Instru-
ment 7 of 2007, authorities did not require the full EIA report approval
process for most mining activities.4 By early 2007, in the midst of
pressures to support the government’s operation, one newspaper writer
asserted that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera should be “applauded” (The
Herald, 2007b). As unpacked in the next sections of this article, such a
view needs critical scrutiny for several reasons, as it concealed not only
diﬀerent political and economic logics of control but also highly con-
tentious - in some cases devastating – impacts in mining areas.
Between January and June of 2007, I participated in a series of
meetings with artisanal and small-scale miners who were grappling
with diﬃculties in complying with EIAs, with many miners expressing
concern about deteriorating relations with authorities, the prohibitive
costs of completing EIA reports to comply with government policy, the
lack of institutional support, steep ﬁnes and unpleasant encounters with
aggressive police. These problems not only fuelled deep frustration; in
many cases they halted income generation activities in 2007. Two years
later I interviewed some of the same miners who felt that the EIA
system was still being severely misused, both rhetorically and in ma-
terial terms. In meetings organised by small-scale miners associations in
May 2009, I also participated in discussions with miners and govern-
ment authorities, including one where Honourable Francis Nhema, the
(then) Minister of Environment and Tourism, urged small-scale miners
to complete EIAs or face legal consequences, arguing in a speech that
“EIAs are for you, so you can be better miners, more responsible, more caring
with the environment” (ﬁeld notes, Harare, May 15, 2007). Given “the
complete absence of community consultation before the operation,” as one
Kadoma-based small-scale miner phrased the problem, this government
rhetoric was met with scepticism, though some small-scale miners
agreed that more should be done to improve risk mitigation and the
idea of countering a hegemonic system of environmental policy en-
forcement was perceived in varying ways. As one Bulawayo-based
small-scale miner articulated it, miners became a “national scapegoat” –
with miners’ “parallel economy” activities (particularly including
selling to non-oﬃcial gold buyers) blamed for exacerbating the coun-
try’s economies woes, while the EIA issue created an environmental
“excuse” for aggressively policing miners. The approach used by au-
thorities elicited critiques of both injustices in the ‘implementation’
approach as well as much wider injustices in the socio-political rela-
tions in which EIA enforcement discourses were situated, both dis-
cussed below.
3. Encountering EIA geographies: The ‘Rule of Experts’ and the
Politics of Waiting
While interpretations of enforcement rhetoric in relation to the
politics of violence and control are discussed further in Section 4 of this
article, it is instructive to ﬁrst unpack the EIA controversy by con-
sidering how an imposed “rule of experts” – to borrow Timothy
Mitchell’s phraseology – was encountered within a (changing) techno-
bureaucratic logic. To resume mining after Operation Chikorokoza
Chapera began, a miner was required to enlist an expert from the
Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s roster of qualiﬁed consultants
to conduct the EIA. In interviewing small-scale miners in Kadoma,
Mazowe, Insiza, Umzingwani and Shamva several trends emerged.
Among small-scale miners who held licenses for mining, some –
amongst the more economically well-oﬀ ‘class’ of small-scale miners –
explained that they had managed to recruit environmental experts5 to
4 Guidelines introduced in the 1990s had recommended the use of EIAs for mining,
with large-scale mining models in mind (Hollaway, 1997). The practice of conducting EIA
reports had been widely referred to as a “voluntary” and “ad hoc” practice until the
Environmental Management Act of 2003 (Gwimbi, 2014), which technically required
EIAs for a list of prescribed activities (including mining), although in practice this was
largely not enforced actively until 2007. Statutory Instrument 7 elaborated on the En-
vironmental Management Act, outlining required procedures for conducting EIAs, regis-
tration of EIA consultants, issuance of EIA certiﬁcates and ﬁnes.
5 These were generally professionals based in cities far from the mines.
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write EIA reports but were waiting over long periods while the Ministry
of Environment and Tourism (through the Environmental Management
Agency [EMA]) processed their EIA paperwork; this included delays in
excess of 6months or even a year. However, by far, most artisanal and
small-scale miners interviewed said that they could not aﬀord to pay
EIA experts the necessary fees, which were prohibitive. The amounts in
2007 varied partly because of hyperinﬂation and variable currency
conversion rates but were equivalent to thousands of US dollars. By
2009, the costs linked with the EIA reporting requirements included an
US$4000 fee paid to expert consultants plus a government EIA regis-
tration fee of US$1006 in addition to 1.5% of the “project cost”7 (paid to
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism). Under national EIA policies,
the same generic environmental guidelines and EIA reporting require-
ments existed for a rural villager digging a hole on her/his own as for a
large or medium-sized mining operation.
Mitchell’s discussion of expertise articulated how the “appearance”
of “universal rules of property” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 56) served as a
cornerstone to colonial order and violence in Egypt, with “expert”
planning promoted by authorities to advance “modernity.” In Zim-
babwe, the universality of the EIA requirement in 2007 became a bu-
reaucratic rationale within a modernist frame among state oﬃcials. Yet
meeting the EIA stipulation was the ﬁnal stage in an already-arduous
process of becoming a legal miner – after securing a prospecting license,
pegging a mining area (which also required hiring an expert – a pro-
fessional geologist) and securing a mining license. Most small-scale
miners interviewed in all of the study areas spoke of being victimized
rather than assisted by authorities during Operation Chikorokoza Cha-
pera – and knew people in prison for illegal mining or smuggling as well
as people who had to pay steep ﬁnes to environmental oﬃcials. Ad-
dressing the years following Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, Murungu
et al.’s (2012) analysis of mining sector licensing showed how reg-
ulatory requirements continued to be onerous and had particularly
discriminatory eﬀects on female artisanal miners, who dis-
proportionately could not meet the requirements – partly as women
involved in mining tended to have especially limited economic means8.
In the midst of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, I conducted interviews
with several women who outlined how the EIA requirement and related
policing made it such that they repeatedly had to stop mining from
2007 to 2009. EIA reports had to include full accounts of the environ-
mental context, risks, mining plans and public consultations, with ul-
timate approval from ﬁve government agencies. While some women’s
groups of small-scale miners were seeking to put together resources to
try to pay the costs of an EIA consultant, others gave up, informing me
that they were “waiting” for EMA to change its approach.
A further set of particularly disconcerting problems also became
apparent, pertaining to how materialities and the “matter of nature”
(Bakker and Bridge, 2006) were being treated: many of the EIAs that
were completed did not address the real risks and management issues in
the ASM operations. In an over-simpliﬁed and over-optimistic account,
in 2007, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) website re-
posted a story that had been printed in a Zimbabwe newspaper (The
Herald, 2007a) with this assumption made: “From the [EIA] report, will
emerge a clear picture of the environment in which a miner is operating and
the suitability of the site for mining operations.” Interviews with EIA
consultants, government oﬃcials and small-scale miners - including
members of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) (an umbrella as-
sociation that represents 30 associations nationally) – suggested that
this statement signiﬁcantly misstates reality. Some EIA consultants ac-
knowledged that the EIA model was expert-driven, expensive, and often
provided little or no consideration to speciﬁc practices used in the
small-scale mining operations. One of the self-reﬂexive critiques they
oﬀered was that strategies to manage mercury and minimize mercury
pollution – crucial in ASM but not in large-scale mining – were not
addressed in many EIAs. This is despite the known concern that mer-
cury use in small-scale gold mining poses health and environmental
risks (Spiegel and Veiga, 2010; Spiegel, 2009b; Selin, 2014). This
oversight was largely due to the fact that consultants were experienced
in conducting EIAs with mining generically (many of whom schooled in
EIAs for larger-scale mining operations) but often less focused on ASM
practices speciﬁcally. As one Bulawayo-based EIA consultant noted
(based on his experiences with EIAs in the Bulawayo region and else-
where in Zimbabwe), in many cases EIA reports drew attention to the
types of vegetation in an area and diﬀerent aquatic species and “but-
terﬂies on the premises”9 while neglecting issues relating to how miners
were planning to mitigate risks in ASM. As the EIA was a separate
process from the Environmental Management Plan that dictates on-the-
ground strategies for risk mitigation, the requirement for two separate
processes became critical in the eyes of many small-scale miners, who
widely felt they should indeed have to do the latter, but not the former.
While it was becoming increasingly apparent to some people that
the EIA was a controversial rationale to exert control over small-scale
miners for a variety of economic reasons, there was also signiﬁcant
variation in how EIA consultants performed their work, with some
consultants sympathetic to the fact that the system was problematic.
Machaka et al. (2013), while not discussing mining speciﬁcally, un-
packed relationships between consultants responsible for writing EIAs
and the Environmental Management Agency, noting “expectations be-
tween the regulatory authority and the consultants which are not being
fulﬁlled by either party,” questioning the quality of reports produced as
“EIAs.” Indeed such concerns were encountered in my ﬁeldwork as
well. In some cases, ﬂaws with EIAs were attributed to EIA consultants
being government employees themselves. The requirement to do a
consultancy report seemed, to some miners, to do little more than ﬁ-
nancially reward such individuals and a small number of independent
professionals registered as EIA consultants – in addition to making the
process of ‘legitimate’ mining more expensive, criminalising large po-
pulations and altering the dynamics of the political economy of accu-
mulation and control in the gold sector. In numerous cases, the con-
sultants would copy the report that they completed for Region X in
order to do a second EIA report for Region Y. I met ﬁve EIA consultants
who reported this trend. This was conveyed, for instance, in this in-
terview10 in Insiza District:
Question: As you have done EIAs for diﬀerent mines, could you tell
me about the diﬀerences and similarities?”
Respondent (EIA consultant): “I copied the EIA report I did for a mill
at Kadoma-Chakari…there were some diﬀerences [with the
Bulawayo mine area which was also assessed by the same con-
sultant] but it is easiest to copy and paste, you know, because the
issues are the same.”
Question: “Do you think the EIA report helps signiﬁcantly to manage
environmental risks?”
Respondent (EIA consultant): “To be honest, it is just a formality.
6 Government fees that miners had to pay varied and often exceeded this amount,
depending on the government oﬃcer in question and particular moment in time. Some of
the dynamics in setting government fees are discussed further in Section 4 of this article,
along with informal systems of payment.
7 The notion of a “project cost” is oﬃcially inscribed in the government’s EIA policies
and reﬂects a model of well-capitalized mining ventures rather than subsistence/survival-
driven small-scale or artisanal mining. As discussed in Section 4 of this article, paying the
government a percentage of a “project cost” is one of many points of contention that
small-scale miners and environmental oﬃcials debated in the years that followed.
8 In addition to documenting gendered economic disparities and experiences of har-
assment experienced by women and men, their survey shows how women in mining also -
on average - tended to have less legal literacy and specialized technical knowledge,
making attempts to navigate the numerous licensing processes even more diﬃcult or
impossible.
9 Interview with Bulawayo-based Gold Collections Oﬃcer, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,
and part-time environmental consultant (EIA report writer), April 27, 2009, Bulawayo.
10 Interview with Bulawayo-based environmental consultant (EIA report writer), April
23, 2009, Filabusi, Insiza District.
S.J. Spiegel Geoforum 87 (2017) 95–107
99
Nobody reads the report but it is still necessary.”
Question: “Necessary according to the law?”
Respondent (EIA consultant): “Yes.”
Question: “Did the small-scale miners participate in the EIA stu-
dies?”
Respondent (EIA consultant): “No, the owner [of the mine] asked
me to do the report…The miners were not involved.”
Question: “Will the EIA help to ensure that small-scale miners are
aware of the main risks with mercury management?”
Respondent (EIA consultant): “No… There need to be other pro-
grammes to educate the miners… The EIA is a report for the gov-
ernment. Maybe nobody will read it.”
The above thoughts resonate with the work of Chimhowu et al.
(2010) who provided a multi-sector overview of environmental con-
cerns and noted the political nature of EIA processes in Zimbabwe,
including that “the whole EIA process is considered ﬂawed and, ac-
cording to an EIA consultant, characterised by corruption, cronyism and
shocking quality of EIA reports which are often compiled from a desk
study using cut-and-paste” (Chimhowu et al., 2010, p. 66). Their work
did not speciﬁcally focus on EIAs for gold mining, nor did they seek to
unpack the dynamic power relations involved in creating an environ-
mental rationalization for Operation Chikorokoza Chapera as this article
is addressing; nonetheless, the ﬁndings in this study echo their ob-
servation regarding a “conﬂict of interests between developers who
commission EIAs, consultants who carry out the EIAs and produce re-
ports, and oﬃcers who are responsible for reviewing, approving and
monitoring” (p. 66).11 In 2009, an EIA consultant and a small-scale
miner, interviewed together near Harare, spoke of the EIA system as a
“superﬁcial paper exercise.” As one small-scale miner articulated in an
interview in Insiza District, at a mining site near Filabusi in December
2012, “This was protecting the environment on paper, just on paper.” As
such, the experiences that unfolded in Zimbabwe, while in a vastly
diﬀerent political context, resonated with arguments made elsewhere in
Africa; for example in Ghana, studies on mining conﬂicts have noted
that eﬀorts to implement EIAs in artisanal mining situations were seen
“as more of a bureaucratic hurdle and money-making initiative than
sound regulatory practice” (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007) and have in-
dicated that general EIA reporting requirements are not suitable me-
chanisms for governing all kinds of mining.12
Some media discourses in Zimbabwe noted that the heavy-handed
enforcement regime was also a cause of new economic problems with
signiﬁcant impacts. In 2009, “High Fees Drive Out Small-Scale Miners”
was the headline of one news article (Kawaza, 2009) which observed
that “only about a quarter of the estimated 1.5million small-scale mi-
ners who were aﬀected by the government’s clean-up operation code-
named Operation Chikorokoza Chapera have resumed operations due to
the high registration fees and Environmental Impact Assessment con-
sultant costs.” This news piece indicated that expensive and bureau-
cratic EIA processes added to illegality in the mining sector by turning
primary ore miners into illegal unregulated riverbed panners while
“depriving the country of much needed foreign currency.” The ZMF
argued that aggressive enforcement drove large numbers of miners into
more rudimentary gold panning activities (such as searching for gold in
rivers with basic equipment), explaining that compared with small-
scale mining of primary ores and milling, basic alluvial gold panning
was often less easy to monitor and control due to its dispersed nature.
While the zealousness of police forced small-scale miners into pre-
carious mining (including working at night), further hindering the
adoption of safety and environmental risk management procedures,
these dynamics in turn fanned the ﬂames of the anti-ASM environ-
mental discourse; in this sense, a ‘vicious circle’ was created with Op-
eration Chikorokoza Chapera, prompting growing sentiments that au-
thorities were hurting the cause of environmental protection. As
conveyed by one small-scale miner, “In Mazowe, people see EMA [the
Environmental Management Agency] and they literally run away in the
mountains…they disappear or try” (interview, Harare, February 2013),
adding: “the CID [police in the Criminal Investigation Department] would
come and ask for money and EMA papers [i.e. Environmental Management
Agency EIA papers] without understanding the environmental management
issues.” He described ﬂeeing miners as “waiting” before returning to
mining.
Indeed, while Jeﬀrey (2010) and Bayart (2007) referred to the mid-
2000s period in Zimbabwe as one where the whole nation was engaged
in “the politics of waiting” in the sense of “waiting for the future”, in-
tensiﬁed policing contributed to speciﬁcs forms of waiting in gold
mining-dependent communities: for some miners, migration to other
gold mining areas was the only answer and this sometimes meant
mining in more ecologically sensitive areas; for others, waiting took
place in the form of secretive processing of ores and an increased use of
labour-intensive hand milling methods; some mill owners described
perpetually paying EMA oﬃcials to look the other way when they
visited mills – and then “waiting” for those oﬃcials to return again, and
still other forms of waiting emerged also as some miners spoke of
waiting for their relatives to come out of jail. Perhaps one of the most
powerful illustrations of the EIA system’s ‘embeddedness’ in a ‘politics
of waiting’ was provided by a Harare-based EIA consultant who, when
interviewed in December 2012, was awaiting payment from three dif-
ferent small-scale miners who were engaging in what he called “not
authorised” gold mining. Having completed his EIA reports for his
customers, he described how the economic situation was such that
many small-scale miners found it diﬃcult to comply and pay con-
sultants, but he was hoping that payments could be made in-
crementally. When interviewed again in February 2013, he had not yet
received payment and thus abandoned his work as an environmental
consultant; in what might be interpreted as a microcosm of the much
wider political and economic challenges unfolding at the time, he de-
scribed how he then joined the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)
instead, becoming “a government spy”, one of the more ﬁnancially
rewarding jobs available to talented young professionals.13 The point
here is to stress that multiple kinds of waiting were inextricably tied to
the techno-politics of a new enforcement regime, with state actors ex-
plicitly invoking the need to wait for expert review before proceeding
with approval, in a system where costs and technical obstacles for ‘le-
gitimization’ were – for most – insurmountable. Speaking of ‘techno-
politics’ here in the sense of a “legal legitimisation” diﬃculties thus
provides a necessary – though partial and incomplete - analytical
window into changing struggles that were also situated within larger
projects of control and accumulation by powerful actors. Some of these
complex aspects of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera and its aftermath are
further discussed below.
11 Diﬀering sets of EIA challenges have been experienced in other sectors beyond gold
mining; for example, in Zimbabwe’s large-scale platinum mining sector, Gwimbi and
Nhamo (2016) discuss problems of EIA ineﬀectiveness and follow-up.
12 While Operation Chikorokoza Chapera created deep strains on relations between
miners and authorities, in a policy design sense, some of the EIA problems during the
operation were predicted years earlier; academics previously advocated for a more user-
focused system where miners – instead of consultants – were involved as the central
actors in risk identiﬁcation. Hilson (2002) noted that a generic “all-encompassing EIA
process” for small- and large-scale mines can fuel problems especially if a system was
“designed for evaluating the environmental aspects of large-scale mines but is being used
concurrently to assess comparatively simpler industrial activities.” In the process, he
wrote “a number of evaluation criteria can be made redundant, which can make the
procedure less rigorous overall (p. 163).
13 Tendi (2016) and McGregor (2013) provide wider discussions of the ‘pulls’ into the
CIO in this period, with the numbers of people in the CIO and the power of secret in-
telligence surveillance (in support of the ruling political party) increasing in several
realms of state politics, while civil servants in other state bureaucracies struggled (and
waited long periods) to get paid at all.
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4. Interpreting economic and political geographies of EIA
impositions
4.1. EIA discourse as rhetorical politics - Operation Chikorokoza Chapera
as ‘Another Operation Murambatsvina’
While certain political ecology approaches give primary attention to
scientiﬁc knowledge production about environmental impacts and re-
source conﬂicts on local scales, others focus on hegemonic processes at
play in the rhetorical framings of power on wider scales, class, race,
party politics and broader histories in which national tensions are si-
tuated (Mann, 2009; Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2015). Studying nar-
ratives around Operation Chikorokoza Chapera through a political
ecology lens gives rise to a vast array of analytical possibilities. As this
operation was a drastic campaign to police mining nationwide it might
appear to ﬁt tidily within a broad macro-narrative about the political
economy of patronage and calculated corruption at the top levels of
government, with environmental justiﬁcations merely serving as a mask
for ‘non-environmental’ interests – a “façade for corruption,” as one
international mining consultant suggested to me. Notwithstanding the
strong signiﬁcance of such dynamics, Donald Moore’s pleas for critical
nuance in political ecology theorizing are still relevant here. In “Suf-
fering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe,” Moore (2005)
expressed ambivalence about de-territorialized broad-sweeping ac-
counts of the power of “the state” and emphasizes the notion of
“shifting alignments and contingent constellations of power” (p. 7) to
express how “micropractices matter” (p. 2) when making sense of si-
tuated, culturally and historically produced discursive practices and
power relations that link with “state” projects. Without any ambiguity,
injustices in Operation Chikorokoza Chapera were clearly not the mere
result of sudden poor planning within one ministry or reducible to a
mere single moment of state power. For small-scale miners, the op-
eration – while clearly driven because of gold’s signiﬁcance as a key
source of foreign currency – kept continually producing new stories of
power – with devastating eﬀects. These were perceived according to
diverse social relations aﬀected in diﬀerent regions of the country and
through diﬀerent techniques of control. Operation Chikorokoza Chapera
was initially an eﬀort led by the Reserve Bank and the police - and those
to whom police reported – to monopolise control over the gold sector.
However, at times some small-scale miners came to feel that “EMA [the
Environmental Management Agency”] was leading Operation Chikor-
okoza Chapera” (interview, February 2013). While some people wel-
comed eﬀorts at stopping potentially destructive mining in a diﬃcult
economic situation, others endured the eﬀects of state power through
experiences of going to prison; some encountered injustices as police
conﬁscated equipment and some felt squeezed by environmental oﬃ-
cials’ demands and repeat visits in mining sites; and some engaged in
conﬂict with farmers who long wanted miners oﬀ their land before
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera began. An overarching project of control
– led by elites within ZANU-PF – was clearly central to the operation,
yet the danger of telling ‘a single story’ of power would be to overlook
the numerous social, political and economic frictions in which the op-
eration was embedded. A related analytical danger would be to assume
that power was only operating in a coercive mode to control “things”
(resources) without seeing how the operation also gained force from
hegemonic environmental narratives and discourses of proper social
conduct; as Moore (2005) stressed, the power of governmentality lies
precisely in how it targets “relations rather than things” (my emphasis),
ultimately “entangling subjects, space, and resources” (Moore, 2005, p.
7).
In various ways, this operation produced new kinds of fear. One
miner reﬂected on how “Arrests were indiscriminate. Sometimes police
came to check if you were recording your gold sales and to get gold
themselves, and used the environmental rationale…If you don’t fence in
a shaft, that’s 2 years in prison for that…but even if you didn’t do
anything wrong you were punished” (interview, Harare, February
2013). Several small-scale miners I interviewed during Operation
Chikorokoza Chapera suggested speciﬁcally that this operation be un-
derstood as a “crackdown in the context of other crackdowns” and drew
explicit parallels with Operation Murambatsvina (translated as
“Operation Drive out the Rubbish”), a much-critiqued aggressive gov-
ernment campaign in urban areas that took place in 2005. Operation
Murambatsvina, introduced by authorities allegedly to “cleanse” urban
spaces of disorder, also aﬀected hundreds of thousands of people (Potts,
2006; Kamete, 2017; Hammar, 2008). In numerous cases, people who
came to depend on small-scale mining were aﬀected by both opera-
tions, having had to change their livelihood and survival strategies.14
The use of modernist ‘planning’ rhetoric in Operation Chikorokoza
Chapera resonated with that used in Operation Murumbatsvina, as did
the viliﬁcation of informality; and both used police in conﬁscating
goods, destroying homes and devastating income sources for already-
marginalised populations. Some media made analogies with Operation
Murumbatsvina and suggested that the ruling party was using Operation
Chikorokoza Chapera to ‘punish’ communities for not giving it strong
support in 2006 elections (Sokwanele, 2007). While this framing may
over-play a particular electoral politics logic, since Operation Chikor-
okoza Chapera aﬀected diverse people in rural locations, including areas
that were historically ZANU-PF strongholds, discourses on “unruliness”
took on prominence as an obfuscation of policing, rent-seeking and new
strategies of resource control.
Without doubt, many people working in the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism aspired to see the well-intentioned im-
plementation of EIAs in order to reduce mining sector risks – and ma-
terial concerns about pollution, waste management, river destruction
and lack of land rehabilitation all fuelled interventionist discourses.
Yet, amid hyperinﬂation in 2007 and 2008, oﬃcials in mining, en-
vironment and ﬁnance ministries as well as police units all mobilised
–and, importantly, at times competed – to assert power in the country’s
unstable state of aﬀairs in the mining sector, rendering notions of
technocratic ‘planning’ exceedingly political.15 Policies of the Reserve
Bank– which set low gold prices for miners – exacerbated powerful
actors’ exploitation of parallel market (informal) trade channels outside
of oﬃcial gold buying channels. Under the Gold Trade Act, all gold had
to be sold to the Reserve Bank or Fidelity Printers, an arm of the Re-
serve Bank; however, the price paid for the gold was linked to the
Zimbabwe dollar value, which was (until 2009) a fraction of the in-
ternational trading rate. Several small-scale miners argued that police
aggression allegedly because of “illegal gold trade” was fuelled by the
anti-miner sentiments of “EMA mentalities” (interview, December
2015). Conversely, sometimes police aggression against small-scale
miners was reported as being sparked by illegal trade and smuggling
and then penalties were eventually given for environmental policy in-
fractions. Even if partly “ecological,” EIA enforcement could certainly
be seen at least partly as an “excuse” for oﬃcially shutting down mines
as gold pricing proved to be problematic throughout the 2006–2009
period before the government accepted the U.S. dollar as its currency
(which miners and others had lobbied for intensely).
Importantly, while the Reserve Bank’s low gold prices fuelled selling
to illegal gold buyers and heightened technocratic interest in tem-
porarily halting illegal mining activities (with the EIA requirement as
an excuse), the economic situation also meant that salaries for police
and public sector workers were meagre, leading to diverse oﬃcials
14 Several analogies with Operation Murambatsvina and Operation Chikorokoza Chapera
can be drawn: both produced a myriad of political interpretations, involve large numbers
of police and costing the country large sums of money (see Zimbabwe Independent,
2007). Kamete, 2008a,b; Kamete, 2017 wrote about Operation Murambatsvina stressing
the convergence of modernist planning rhetoric and political interests, with elites using
violence as a strategy of control along with rhetoric on “stamping out spatial unruliness.”
15 During Operation Chikorkoza Chapera and after, there was a noticeable increase in
powerful high-ranking politicians publicly blaming others (within the ruling party) for
mining sector corruption and mismanagement.
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themselves becoming reliant on mining income. While there are nu-
merous reported cases of high-ranking politicians being directly in-
volved in mining and using Operation Chikorokoza Chapera as a basis for
accumulation, police also were miners or became part of the value
chain by requiring payments as a condition for allowing mining or
milling. For example, in Insiza, miners reported (in 2007, 2009 and
2012) that police regularly demanded bribes from both registered mill
owners and artisanal miners who did not have licenses. Insiza experi-
enced considerable violence during Operation Chikorokoza Chapera as
well as election-related violence in 2008. In Insiza, many small-scale
miners described how the motivation for the operation was neither ‘just
economic’ nor ‘just environmental,’ and that police aggression during
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was excessive, revealing a level of vio-
lence and a political nature that deﬁed a simple logic of economic or
environmental control.16
Ultimately, as Operation Chikorokoza Chapera involved several arms
of state power including the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Reserve
Bank, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Mines
and Mining Development as well as the CIO among others, it is neces-
sary to conceptualise the operation as product of converging struggles
with wide-ranging – and sometimes clearly contradictory – interests at
play rather than a coherent state project. While government oﬃcials
espoused a “modernization” discourse and occasionally depicted the
operation as paving a foundation to force artisanal miners to “grow up”
and become “proper” miners, occasionally this ideology was tempered
with views expressed by environmental oﬃcials who suggested that
miners could “form groups” to complete a collective EIA – which again
assumed a logic of forced social ordering. Regardless of what motives
drove policy changes, in practice the “EIA” – in some situations – be-
came a divisive instrument for subjugating artisanal miners in a system
of informal politics and informal economics, working in what Jones
(2010b) called the “kukyia-kiya economy” (referring to the “multiple
forms of making-do”). State actors’ actions in the name of EIA en-
forcement were experienced in a wide range of ways, sometimes ac-
companying other allegations against miners, including illegal gold
possession. In some locales, police crackdowns led to companies being
given rights to mine areas where communities previously mined; dis-
concertingly, in some instances companies that took over sometimes
mined without EIAs, even though environmental impacts were the
stated reason for stopping earlier mining.
One example of this occurred in the Umzingwani River, where ar-
tisanal miners, during a research visit in 2012, spoke angrily of a
Chinese company mining being given the rights to mine by the Ministry
of Mines and Mining Development17, then destroying the Umzingwani
River. Local small-scale miners urged me to take note of the damage
caused by a company in this regard – it was hardly recognizable as a
‘river’ after the company was ﬁnished mining. The area had previously
been a gold panning site for those living in the area. Rural district
councillors from both of the two main political parties acknowledged in
interviews that this company had badly damaged the river and pro-
duced impacts far worse than those attributable to local artisanal and
small-scale miners. “The rivers will never ﬂow the way it used to ﬂow,”
voiced one small-scale miner, who expressed concern for those who
used to conduct alluvial gold panning there and downstream as well as
the wider community.18
A diﬀerent kind of EIA politics was encountered at a gold mining
site in Insiza District near Filabusi, at a mine that had existed for
15 years prior to the crackdown. Some mines and mills were abandoned
during Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, but this mine had the involve-
ment of a Member of Parliament and Rural District Council Members
from the ZANU-PF. As some of the other mills in the region were not
functional, miners were sometimes pressured (given the lack of options)
to use this mine’s milling services and work in its mines. When
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera began and police came, some miners
were able to continue working there, despite having not conducted an
EIA, and the ability to continue operating was attributed to personal
connections with ZANU-PF. Concerns were raised by artisanal miners in
Insiza that powerful miners used political connections to harass other
miners during the period of the crackdown.19 According to a Filabusi-
based small-scale gold miner, the owners used the Green Bombers
(ZANU-PF youth brigades20) to displace other miners in the district.
“The politics closed things down,” he argued, emphasizing “politics” be-
fore explaining that opposition party supporters also rebelled against
powerful ZANU-PF-aﬃliated businessmen who were seeking to mono-
polise mineral resource access. The point here is not to suggest that
police crackdowns and EIA rhetoric should be understood purely within
the context of ZANU-PF domination and control on local scales, but
instead that the crackdowns were adapted to multiple economic and
political interests, and was indicative of changing forms of politicized
environmentalism. While government rhetoric played on the notion of
miners as environmentally irresponsible subjects who needed to con-
duct EIAs and be policed to prevent degradation, punishing miners for
not completing the EIA report process was also used as a control tactic
and economic accumulation strategy, a political survival strategy, a
spectacle of state power and a way of politicizing “informality.”
4.2. Contesting a sense of hegemony, seeking an alternative
Loftus and Lumsden (2008) revisited how “[f]or Gramsci, the sta-
bilisation of a particular worldview, and the acceptance of this view by
diﬀerent groups (often against the interests of the individuals involved)
are achieved through the operation of hegemony” and they explored
attempts to challenge hegemonic power in South African contexts of
water politics. In the context of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera in
Zimbabwe, violent coercive power and hegemonic discourse went hand
16 In some cases police visits made it apparent to miners that intimidation was a means
to shaping both economic and political alliances, with pressure placed on artisanal miners
to show support for the ruling party. In some (though not all) cases, indicating varying
degrees of what could be theorised as consent or ‘outwardly projected consent,’ some
artisanal miners tried to show and instrumentalize membership to the ZANU-PF party
(and sometimes particular factions therein) to protect themselves from potential state
violence and eviction.
17 As discussed elsewhere, ZANU-PF-China ties have been marked by deals involving
mineral extraction rights as well as weapons transfers that drew intense critical global
scrutiny (particularly in 2008) (see Spiegel and Le Billon, 2009). Having said that, re-
gardless of the particular arrangements in the high-level geopolitical relations that have
inﬂuenced mineral rights allocations, the crucial point here is that, after Operation Chi-
korokoza Chapera, the injustices of criminalising artisanal miners’ livelihoods were wit-
nessed locally in a context where the physically observable illegal activities of a company
in a river went unpunished.
18 While this episode in Umzingwani did not draw much media coverage, the more
infamous example of eviction and EIA politics was diamond mining in Marange District;
artisanal miners were violently displaced from a diamond mining area in Marange in
2008 in a campaign that drew global news headlines because of military shootings and
violence. While much scholarly criticism addressed the militarization and how Russian
and Chinese companies were given rights to mine diamonds, groups such as the
Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association sought to highlight one of the less pro-
minent narratives - that the contracted companies lacked proper EIAs and environmental
monitoring and proceeded to pollute Odzi River and degrade the area. In 2015, the
government’s Auditor General on the Environmental Monitoring of Mining Operations
published a damning critique of the companies and the responses by EMA under what (by
then) was rebranded the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, noting that EMA’s
penalty system “proved to be non-deterrent.” The report stressed a problem where of-
fenders could be “penalized more than once” for pollution and simply pay their way out
of problems “without taking any measures to prevent environmental pollution” (Chiri,
2015, p. v).
19 This point was stressed by a gold panner I interviewed on May 4, 2009, in Filabusi.
The same point was made by an MDC Council Member in Insiza during an interview on
April 24, 2009.
20 While my study is one of the ﬁrst to document the use of Green Bombers in Operation
Chikorokoza Chapera, Kamete (2010) discusses the use of “Green Bombers” in Operation
Murambatsvina, explaining that ‘Green Bomber’ is a term for “a graduate of the con-
troversial National Youth Training Service regarded by critics as a political survival
project designed to produce militia for ZANU-PF’s campaign of violence” (p. 60).
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in hand, and the hegemonic languages of ‘order’ in the mining sector
were shaped by longstanding histories of technocratic resource gov-
ernance as well as rapidly deepening political tensions in the
2006–2008 period and after. Raftopoulos (2010) examines this period
as one that produced a “passive revolution” – where the two main
political parties, after the contested 2008 election, formed a short-lived
‘power-sharing’ government (the ‘Government of National Unity’) but
where eﬀectively all the main political powers (including powers over
mining) resided with ZANU-PF and where opposition voices were
constricted. This is not to say, though, that small-scale miners were
passive. Although a lengthy analysis of the agency and advocacy of
various groups of artisanal and small-scale miners is beyond the scope
of this article, recognizing that some of these groups sought to contest
aspects of hegemonic discourse, policing and technocratic governance
during and after Operation Chikorokoza Chapera is indispensible. In
addition to the ‘everyday’ acts of resistance that many small-scale mi-
ners employed in trying to evade police and state agents, starting in
2007, the ZMF engaged in meetings with mining and environmental
ministry authorities; their advocacies included both pleas for short-term
reforms to give small-scale miners a “reprieve” as well as wider long-
term changes. In a context where multiple other forms of population
displacement, economic contraction and political violence were un-
folding (Hammar et al., 2010; Alexander and McGregor, 2013), these
both had limitations.
In 2007, the ZMF – which represented a signiﬁcant political con-
stituency, despite small-scale miners being generally criminalized –
sought to engage government oﬃcials in policy dialogue. The im-
mediate short-term proposal was to allow miners to pay the EIA pro-
cessing costs to the government in three instalments. It was hoped that
both the Ministry of Environment and Tourism would agree to give
small-scale miners this “reprieve” so they could return work as soon as
the ﬁrst instalment was paid. In some cases EMA oﬃcials granted this
reprieve, although variations existed regarding the oﬃcial government
payment required, according to diﬀerent individuals’ connections and
negotiation abilities (as well as variable currency translation values
amid hyperinﬂation until 2009). Sometimes when confronted by small-
scale miners, EMA oﬃcials engaged in what small-scale miners saw as a
hegemonic ‘politics of deﬂection’ by indicating that some expert con-
sultants were “unfortunately unscrupulous” (meeting in Harare,
December 2012) but that miners had to abide by the prescribed expert
system nonetheless.
The idea of promoting “group” EIAs might superﬁcially appear to
align with technical ideas put forward in other countries such as
Tanzania, where suggestions have been made to start “introducing
block EIA and management plans to accommodate a number of ASM
operators and for joint responsibilities” (Mwakaje, 2012). Yet, forcing
artisanal miners to pay for and submit expensive technical expert EIA
reports still perpetuates widespread criminalization and elitism21, while
relying on central state oﬃcials as key permission-brokers also re-
produces long-established patterns of centralized control over mining.
Although past scholarship in Zimbabwe has argued that powers over
mineral resource management should be established at district and
village levels, to develop a sense of local ownership and a more de-
centralized system for overseeing simpliﬁed environmental guidelines
and resource management procedures (Shoko, 2002), national shifts
towards a re-centralision of power over the past decade has signaled a
conspicuous trend in the opposite direction. For years, miners have
lobbied to try to force an amendment to the 1961 Mines and Minerals
Act, which carries forward colonial era injustices by vesting vast powers
in the hands of the President and Minister of Mines without creating
speciﬁc legal provisions for artisanal and small-scale mining or modes
of democratic participation in processes governing mineral licensing22
(see Transparency International Zimbabwe, 2013). Eﬀorts to amend the
EIA policy regime thus need to be understood in relation to long-
standing struggles by small-scale miners, who have argued that re-
source laws have been historically biased.23
Bringing critical scrutiny to one of the aspects of hegemony most of
interest to Gramsci – the hegemony of language24 - some associations
argued to the media that the forced use of the English language for all
expert EIA reports was itself a form of injustice that re-entrenched co-
lonial practice. Since small-scale miners were not allowed to use Shona
or Ndebele (the historical languages of indigenous Zimbabweans) to
meet environmental reporting requirements, both the English language
imposition and the required technical jargon of expert EIA reports were
seen as imperial, unnatural and even absurd requirements in mining
areas. As a leader of one of the national small-scale miners federations
argued to the media, “Small-scale miners are being ﬁned between $200 and
$500 by government. We are asking how you can ﬁne someone for not
understanding a book written in a language they don’t read” (The
Zimbabwean, 2014). The ZMF also argued that forcing small-scale
miners to engage experts was exacerbating corruption among oﬃcials,
who were said to have demanded bribes to fast-track EIA approvals (for
those who could aﬀord EIAs), pointing to demands of Rural District
Councils in addition to EMA charges for EIA processing.
A sense of the dynamic nature of the struggle was expressed mem-
orably in the words of a small-scale miner who reﬂected on changing
fee demands from various agents of government, who continually in-
voked miners’ illegality: “The EIA was a monster. The EIA problems kept
multiplying. More oﬃcials kept asking for money” (interview, December
2015). This articulation – evocative of how socio-economic processes in
mining areas need to be understood as dynamic, not ﬁxed – speaks to
the ways in which multiple ‘faces’ of state power appear and re-appear
in diﬀerent moments and places, with diﬀerent demands. While power
may rely on varying combinations of hegemony and coercion, with the
state “appropriating the language of conservation to legitimate both its
claims and its enforcement methods” (Peluso, 1993, p. 201), experi-
ences of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera also highlighted how in-
dividuals associated with state agencies were perceived in varying
ways, with miners seeing some civil servants and politicians as allies
and others as clearly antagonistic.
Meanwhile, as exorbitant fees, rent-seeking and hegemonic expert
language became some of the concerns voiced in the advocacies of
miners’ associations, focussing on these also risked replicating hege-
monic assumptions about expert EIA systems as an appropriate system
in the ﬁrst place. Slightly modifying the EIA system by allowing new
languages for expert reports and a diﬀerent fee structure could make
the expert system more palatable but not necessarily more eﬀective.
Small-scale miners in some cases advocated that there needs to be a
simpliﬁed user-oriented ‘checklist’ system instead of an expensive EIA
system that criminalizes livelihoods; a checklist system could theore-
tically make artisanal and small-scale miners – not consultants – the
21 High costs have also increased the power of wealthy sponsors; artisanal miners in
some cases found themselves forming new alliances with wealthy sponsors who would
cover the costs of licensing and regulatory paperwork, equipment, fuel, etc.
22 Beyond creating deﬁnitions for artisanal and small-scale mining, ASM association
members have also argued that they should have representatives on the Mining Aﬀairs
Board, which is composed of people appointed by the Minister of Mines.
23 For example, as stated by one small-scale miner at a meeting I attended, “the
minimum [in the Mines and Minerals Act] for pegging is 10 hectares. It is too large…The
minimum should be 5 hectares. It’s hard to ﬁnd good areas that aren’t pegged” linking this to
areas allotted to large companies “that have certain shapes that make it hard to work around
them” (Interview, Small-scale miner, Harare, May 15, 2009). He argued that speciﬁc
environmental management protocols should exist for artisanal and small-scale mining
instead of the one-size-ﬁts-all technocratic approach.
24 See Ives (2004), Boothman (2008) and Carlucci (2013) for discussions on Gramsci,
hegemony and language. Others have noted that the historical marginalisation of the
Ndebele language in Zimbabwe should be read through a Gramscian lens on hegemony
(Ndhlovu, 2006). In my interviews, some small-scale miners stressed that the EIA expert
report requirement was hegemonic as an English imposition that entailed highly technical
specialist terminologies that were “foreign” to many Ndebele and Shona speakers alike -
and to many English speakers also.
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responsible agents for demonstrating comprehension of risk. Yet, state
oﬃcials have repeatedly invoked languages of ‘bringing order’ to the
mining sector, presenting a vision of modernisation wherein artisanal
miners are mechanistically envisioned as either criminals or on a
compulsory path towards becoming medium-scale businesses that could
aﬀord one-size-ﬁts-all licensing fees. In some cases, miners described
how they faced an ‘either-or’ choice early on in Operation Chikorokoza
Chapera between working in clandestine mining or working with the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in state mining ventures, under conditions
where payment for work was very low. “It is not just about lowering fees,”
argued one small-scale miner, stressing, “it is about recognising artisanal
mining…Many lives have suﬀered because our mining has suﬀered”
(Harare, February 2013). Although the Environmental Management
Agency eventually – in 2016 – very slightly modiﬁed the EIA system by
replacing the “1.5% of project cost” fee component for small-scale
mining with a ﬂat rate of $210, arguing that this was favourable to
miners (EMA, 2016), the net costs in meeting the EIA requirements
(including the government processing fees and fees paid to consultants)
ultimately increased from their initial levels. For some miners, EIA-re-
lated criminalisation and negative relations with authorities were some
of the most signiﬁcant and long-lasting legacies of Operation Chikor-
okoza Chapera. As reﬂected by one small-scale miner conveying his
uneasy relation with environmental oﬃcials, “It’s like driving without a
license. You become a criminal but you survive – that relationship is not
healthy. It is a vulture situation” (interview, February 2015, Harare).
Finally, re-articulating the politics of “diﬀerence” (Escobar, 2006)
also became seen as a necessary (even if unfortunate) tactic of ad-
vocacy; some small-scale miners associations felt they needed to make
compromises by publicly stating that small-scale miners associations
supported the criminalization of certain modes of artisanal gold pan-
ning (in rivers), reﬂecting pressures to be seen as ‘accepting the crim-
inalization of some’ in order to ‘not’ criminalize others.25 Indeed other
kinds of compromises were also made; some small-scale miners asso-
ciations banned people on their boards from running for political
elections, to create a sense of political neutrality, in some cases leading
to some people leaving the associations temporarily. Some miners ac-
tively showed support for and alignment with ZANU-PF, to police and
other oﬃcials (though it would be over-simplistic to assume that out-
ward actions always mirrored choices made at the voting booth). As
Moore (2005) argued in relation to earlier histories of resource conﬂict,
tactics of compromise and adaptation have long been part and parcel of
the political ecology of struggle, not in some sort of romanticized space
‘outside’ of the webs of state power but often within them. My purpose
in this article here is not to create essentialising narratives about spe-
ciﬁc miners associations or privilege one time-bound or place-bound
power dynamic above all others, but to stress the plurality of inter-
related power dynamics and hegemonic forces operating at once. If a
“hegemonic project,” as the cultural theorist Stuart Hall deﬁnes it, as-
pires to “the remaking of common sense” (Hall, 1988, p. 149), state
oﬃcials’ use of new EIA rhetoric in 2007 could be conceptualized
compellingly, amongst other intersecting interpretations, as a hege-
monic project along these lines. Hegemonic power, regardless of how
‘successful’ it is in eliciting consent and obedience, relies on ideological
conditioning, shaping the discussion of what is taken to be rational, and
can adapt in its interplay with coercive elements of power (Mitchell,
1990). The ‘environmentalisation’ of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera is
illustrative of how coercive power and elite actors’ eﬀorts to build,
regain and maintain political and economic hegemony linked, through
varying social relations, to an expanding nationally hegemonic en-
vironmental modernisation discourse.
These struggles were situated within a diverse set of evolving in-
justices, including a lack of fair resolution after police conﬁscated
equipment, jailing miners for draconian laws (with some miners put in
jail for 5 years for illegal mining or trading), the failure to reform mi-
neral licensing laws that were vestiges of colonialism, diﬃculties of
accessing mining equipment support to a phase-out of safety and eco-
logical hazards, and the ‘expertiﬁcation’ of processes required for le-
gitimising resource use, amongst many others. A consideration of the
‘political ecologies’ of struggle in relation to EIAs thus requires re-
cognising that EIA politics have been (and still are) nested in wide-
ranging webs of relational injustices where technical languages of le-
gitimacy and illegitimacy are heavily politically instrumentalised.
Derman and Ferguson (2000) argued that it is not useful for political
ecology work “to simply describe a hegemonic discourse and critique
it” (p. 3); I echo this sentiment and stress that we need to pay attention
to how actors have mobilised in response to perceived injustices, which
are wrapped up both in contestations over technocratic rationality as
well as explanatory frames that do not ﬁt within tidy theories of state
power, recognizing an unstable and fragmented state.
5. Concluding Remarks
Academics have for years studied EIAs as tools for protecting the
environment, yet, as Cashmore and Richardson (2013) argued, critical
research that focuses in a sustained way, either empirically or theore-
tically, on “power” dynamics surrounding EIAs has been a relatively
recent development. I have argued that a political ecology approach for
conceptualising EIA struggles needs to be carefully attuned to diverse
social relations, temporal speciﬁcity, situated knowledge construction
in relation to territorial and ecological tensions, as well as diﬀerentiated
meanings associated with EIA enforcement discourse, particularly
during periods of intense political and economic changes. In Zimbabwe,
the move to start enforcing EIAs for all types of mining in January 2007
– amid hyperinﬂation and intense political instability – was widely
perceived by small-scale miners as a strategy for generating revenue for
state actors and EIA consultants while remaining an ineﬀective en-
vironmental management strategy. Yet it was more than that. Operation
Chikorokoza Chapera set in motion new material and discursive con-
testations that shaped EIA struggles not only then but in the years
thereafter. Analogous to other situations where state actors have pur-
sued controversial campaigns while casting “peasants as environmental
destroyers” (Bocarejo and Ojeda, 2016, p. 178), this case illustrates the
need to critically understand how changes in resource management
discourses and practices of control - rationalized in the name of ‘en-
forcing technical standards’ - are entangled in contentious power rela-
tions, with far-reaching short and long-term eﬀects.
Although environmental impacts in mining – whether large-scale or
small-scale – can be severe, as can health and safety impacts in this
sector, governmental decision-making is rarely if ever guided by en-
vironmental concern devoid of politics. This article highlights how state
measures to clamp down on artisanal and small-scale miners ostensibly
for not abiding by EIA requirements can mask complex underlying
economic interests and political power struggles. At the same time, a
wider point also can be made in relation to the myriad of power dy-
namics and hegemonic relations at play. This was not merely a familiar
case of large-scale mining attempting to maintain hegemony over small-
scale mining, nor of subaltern groups’ interests aﬀected by a straight-
forward hegemonic form of global capitalism, nor even was it a case of
a coherent state project; rather, a pluralistic lens is needed to see how
multiple power relations were simultaneously shaping artisanal and
small-scale miners’ struggles. Ostensibly technical measures are
25 For example, making a distinction between artisanal gold panning and small-scale
gold mining, a leader of one of the small-scale miners associations told the news media
that ‘We support fully the eradication of gold panning in this country but for legally
licensed miners to be harassed in this manner is unacceptable’ (Makoshori, 2007). No-
tably, in the years following Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, state approaches to the
criminalization of alluvial riverbed gold panning evolved. After the government’s 2006
repeal of the statutory instrument that had allowed Rural District Councils to license
riverbed gold panning, state agencies formed partnerships (in some cases with foreign
companies) to conduct river mining. In 2014 national authorities further restricted the
distance that alluvial gold panning could be conducted from the riverbanks - changing
from a minimum of 30 metres to 200 metres, generating further debate.
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routinely invoked by a variety of actors in eﬀorts to maintain hegemony
over others, and a mix of coercive and hegemonic power dynamics need
to be understood as often co-existing. In this case, some very powerful
actors, from diﬀerent ministries and networks that spanned national
and regional scales, as well as within mining communities themselves,
became part of the EIA story. EIA rhetoric took on a hegemonic char-
acter in artisanal and small-scale mining contexts through the techno-
expertiﬁcation of environmental management and the ideological
framing of what a “modern” miner must do; the hegemony of an im-
posed English language requirement that represented a vestige of co-
lonialism in expert reports; exorbitant EIA consultant fees that were out
of reach for subaltern groups; and an array of practices rationalized in
the name of policies for the national interest, that varied over time and
space and in diﬀering social formations. While large economic interests
were at stake nationally, the ideological rationalisation of relations of
social domination and subordination took diﬀerent forms. This study
thus underscores why it is critically important to understand social and
environmental conﬂicts through a Gramscian political ecology lens,
which rejects overly schematic theories of hegemony (and simple bin-
aries between hegemony and coercive power), while stressing relational
struggles in the interfaces of politics, space and nature (Ekers and
Loftus, 2013) and the micro-political and social practices that produce
meanings linked to resource control and subaltern struggles (Moore,
2005; Horowitz, 2015). As argued in this article, unpacking situated EIA
narratives linked with a plurality of state practices and power relations
creates signiﬁcant possibilities for rethinking articulations of diverse
meanings linked to techno-political measures of resource control and
(de)legitimization.
To conclude, this article suggests why it is important to see the
techno-politics of EIAs as intertwined with complex struggles to control
extraction, revenues, environments and people in diﬀerent moments and
places. Exploring situated storylines about EIA politics also raises im-
portant questions, in particular, about how agency and social resistance
are depicted. Recently, ASM associations in Zimbabwe have been in-
creasing their advocacies about reforming colonial-style mining and
environmental policy. This article builds on the call for scholars to
engage the politics of EIAs in extractive industries to ensure that so-
cioeconomic needs of local communities in mining areas are not un-
dermined (Bedi, 2013), and encourages vigilance in recognizing how
EIAs can be used as hegemonic instruments, paying attention to the
imagined alternatives that small-scale miners’ associations advance
with regards to environmental stewardship. There are perils in looking
only at particular scales of relations to the exclusion of others, and it is
imperative that future work not overlook how advocacy groups have
been mobilizing both to re-orient debates on unjust and ineﬀective EIA
processes and to confront un-implemented EIA processes, and the re-
lations in which these dynamics unfold. As EIA-focused political
ecology evolves in the years ahead, critical scholarship will need to be
open to new strategies for prioritising both the “ecological” and the
“political” – with attention to the myriad of contested meanings that
surface, sometimes subtly, when talking about EIAs and related tech-
nical resource management regimes in the midst of complex struggles.
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